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Abstract 
This paper examines the impacts of real exchange depreciations on the bilateral trade between 
the US and China. Both the theoretical predictions and the empirical evidence suggest that 
Chinese real exchange rate depreciation would stimulate Chinese exports. Using an Error 
Correction Model the we estimate the following long run effects during the period between 
Q1 1995 and Q4 2013: a 1 % depreciation of the Chinese RMB would increase Chinese 
exports by 0,271 % and decrease US exports by 0,62 %. This however is dwarfed by the real 
effects of increasing economic activity in the importing countries. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years Chinese and American researchers and politicians have taken turns of either 
attacking or defending the Chinese monetary policy. The US government has repeatedly 
called for China to abandon its current exchange rate regime and let the renminbi float. 
Claims have been made that China is manipulating its currency, keeping it artificially low 
towards its chief trading partner’s currencies. This is claimed to be done with the purpose of 
acquiring trade benefits, letting Chinese companies export at a premium. The purposes of our 
paper are to research the real effects these alleged currency manipulations would have had 
and present a viewpoint which is neither American nor Chinese.  
 Before 2005 the Chinese renminbi was pegged at a constant rate towards the dollar, they 
have since then been under increasing pressure from the international community to revise 
their exchange rate regime. Because of this they changed their exchange rate regime to be 
constant to a basket of currencies. The basket is weighted between what has been estimated to 
be 15 different currencies with the US dollar having the greatest weight, Oliver (2010), 
however the truth may never be known. They have also acquired the largest currency reserves 
in history the total which is currently not known, the US Treasury Department estimates it at 
$3,3 trillion. This was expected to cause the exchange rate to appreciate greatly, however in 
the end it only appreciated by 2,1 %. The appreciation then continued until the renminbi 
finally was revalued in 2006. There is still however claims that the renminbi needs to further 
appreciate, Alan Greenspan, the former U.S. Federal reserve Chairman famously called it an 
“artificially weak currency”. In 2011 Robert E. Scott of the US Economic Policy Institute 
claimed in his paper that a renminbi appreciation of 25-35 % would create 2,25 million US 
jobs.  
 Chinese monetary policy has been in the spotlight in recent years; its workings are 
mysterious to many. The People’s Bank of China has since 2005 undertaken open market 
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operations with the purpose of balancing the renminbi against a basket of 15 unknown 
currencies with unknown weights. This in conjunction with theoretical evidence from the 
Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis, which states that as an underdeveloped country’s productivity 
rises so should its exchange rate appreciate. This has caused many researchers to claim that 
the Chinese renminbi is severely undervalued. Many different estimations have been made, 
one of the most common being 15-41 % undervaluation (Chang, 2008; Chang and Shao, 
2004; Cheung, Chinn and Fujii, 2009; Cline and Williamson, 2009; Coudert and Couharde, 
2005; Frankel, 2004; Goldstein, 2004; Goldstein and Lardy, 2006; Subramanian, 2010; Zhang 
and Pan, 2004). In their 2009 paper Cline & Williamson argues that a 25-40 % revaluation 
would considerably alleviate the difficulties faced by the US by reducing their annual current 
account deficit by $100-$150 billion by stimulating US exports, a staggering number indeed. 
Yang, Zhang and Tokgoz (2013) come to the conclusion that a 5 % appreciation of the 
renminbi would lead to a 9,7 billion USD reduction in the Chinese trade balance, whilst a 15 
% appreciation would lead to a 25 billion USD reduction. Baak (2008) concludes that in the 
long run a 1 % appreciation of the renminbi would lead to a 1,7 % reduction in Chinese 
exports and a 0,4 % increase in US exports. 
 The Balassa-Samuelsson hypothesis implies that when a country’s marginal product of 
labor in the tradable goods sector increases, it should lead to its real exchange rate 
appreciating (Asea and Corden, 1994). In China however this has not been the case. Explosive 
economic development has not been followed by major appreciations in the real exchange 
rate. This has often been construed as evidence that China is artificially manipulating their 
exchange rate. If this is the case, what are the benefits which China can claim from doing so, 
and what are the effects other countries face? 
  Our hypothesis is that China’s exchange rate depreciating towards their main trading 
partner, the US, is beneficial for their exports and has a negative effect on their imports. 
Whilst for the US we expect the opposite to be the case; a Chinese devaluation would be 
detrimental to their exports and facilitate imports. However it has been argued that the US’s 
manufacturing industry is heavily reliant on imports of raw materials and components, 
suggesting that exchange rate depreciation would not hurt the US as much as it would help 
China (Yang, Zhang, Tokgoz, 2012).  
 In order to determine the effects of exchange rate devaluation this thesis analyses the 
effect of a real exchange rate depreciation on the bilateral trade between two countries; China 
and the US, the thesis analyses the period between 1995 and 2013 using quarterly data. China 
is currently the single largest exporter of goods to the US, taking up 18,7 % of all US imports 
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(All the percentages in this paragraph are from the US Census Bureau). They are however not 
the most significant trading partner of the US, this position is instead occupied by Canada 
(16,1 %), which is not surprising considering the geographical closeness of the two countries. 
Not only does the US import many goods from China, it also exports a significant port of their 
total exports to the country (7,1 %). With this situation in mind, the question of exchange 
rates effect on the trade balance is of utmost importance. 
 We first proceed to look at the theoretical evidence that exchange rate devaluation can 
create trade benefits. We accomplish this by using the “law of one price”, “terms of trade” 
and the Balassa-Samuelsson equations specified by Staiger and Sykes (2008). Finally we 
present the results from our empirical study to see if reality is similar to our theoretical 
predictions and make comparisons to other contemporary studies.  
 To study this relationship we specify an empirical model explaining the linear 
relationship between exports and real exchange rates to test the hypothesis that: 
 
  : Exchange rates have no real effect on exports and imports 
 
 and argue that it can be rejected in favor of: 
 
  : Exchange rates have real effects on exports and imports.  
 
 We also expect the tests to show us a positive relationship, that is: as the real CNY/USD 
rate increases (i.e. the renminbi depreciates or the dollar appreciates) exports from China to 
the US will increase.  
 An important issue in this discussion is of course the stickiness of money; currency 
manipulation depends heavily on prices moving slower than the supply of money. If prices 
and money supply moved in unison it would take away the possibilities of manipulating a 
currency. The last century there has been much debate on this topic: Milton Friedman argued 
that money was in fact non-neutral while Keynes argued that it was long run neutral, i.e. that 
it had no real effects on the economy. To understand the reasons for the growing Chinese 
currency reserves and the alleged currency manipulations we devote a section of this thesis to 
presenting academic viewpoints that coincide with the belief that money is sticky or non-
neutral in the “short run”           
 Our thesis will first discuss theoretical predictions in chapter 2, followed by a review of 
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our chosen empirical model in chapter 3. In chapter 4 we discuss our data sources and then 
finally in chapter 5 we review the results of our empirical study. 
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2. Theory 
In this section we will discuss how exchange rates affect the bilateral trade relationship 
between two countries. This chapter is in most regards based on Staiger and Sykes’ 2008 
paper on exchange rate changes being equivalent to tariffs-cum-subsidies. We have altered 
their equations to instead show only the exchange rate effects.  
 Our aim is to create a theoretically sound picture that will justify our empirical study. 
Our first question in is if exchange rate depreciation can create trade benefits for China. To do 
this we examine exchange rates in a flexible price world, sticky price world and lastly raise a 
discussion as to whether we can really expect prices to be sticky. 
 For simplicity this whole section operates under the assumption that there are only two 
countries in the world, China and the US. We let China act as our “home” country, and denote 
goods produced in China with h. We let the US act as the foreign country and goods produced 
denoted with f. Furthermore we assume that only one tradable goods is produced and is of the 
same quality whether it’s produced in China or the US. 
 Another caveat for this chapter is our choice to refer to all the equations as expressions; 
this is simply to make this section differ from the method chapter.  
2.1 Flexible Prices 
We first assume that prices are fully flexible and start our analysis from there; this describes 
the “long run”. We then proceed to examine the “short run” where prices are often considered 
to be sticky (Staiger and Sykes, 2008). This lets us compare the differences in each scenario. 
 In a world where prices are fully flexible, i.e. prices in one country can instantly adjust 
to compensate for price changes in another one, exchange rates would fully compensate for 
any price differences on tradable goods. In this world a country with floating exchange rates 
we would observe instant changes of exchange rate, while in a country with a fixed rate we 
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would observe instant changes in prices. Under this assumption the following price model 
would be true: 
 
   
    
             Exp. 2.1.1 
 
And 
 
  
  
  
 
 
           Exp. 2.1.2 
 
Where   
  denotes the renminbi price of the goods if produced in China and   
  denotes the 
USD price of the same goods if produced in the US and e is the renminbi/us dollar exchange 
rate. In a world where prices adjust instantly any change in the price of goods in china would 
instantly create a change in prices or the exchange rate between the two countries. This 
relationship is often referred to as “the law of one price”.   
 If we make the model a little more complicated and include shipping costs, subsides, 
tolls and other factors we will still come to the point where no price differences allowing 
arbitrage will be present, e.g. no profit can be made by simply moving a good from one place 
to another as the cost of moving it will ensure that the profit is the same no matter where you 
sell it (shown by Staiger and Sykes (2008)).   
 For prices in a bilateral trade relationship to be in equilibrium three ratios must be in 
equality. 
  
 
  
  the relative CNY price of the good, 
  
 
  
   
 the “terms of trade” between the two 
countries and 
  
 
  
  the relative USD price of the good, this leads us to the following expression:  
 
  
 
  
  [
  
 
  
   
]  
  
 
  
            Exp. 2.1.3 
 
Meaning that the ratio of the good produced in h and f denoted in CNY should equal the 
dollar price of the good produced in h divided by the CNY price of the good produced in f 
subject to the exchange rate. This in turn should equal the dollar price of the good produced in 
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h divided by the good produced in f. We substitute in the first equation arriving at the 
following equation showing that with flexible prices we arrive at equilibrium: 
 
  
 
  
   
  
   
  
   
  
  
 
  
          Exp. 2.1.4 
 
This implies that a change in e will not affect the price ratio of the same goods valuated in 
different countries as both prices will rise at the same level and why shouldn’t they? After all, 
prices can adjust on the spot and exchange rate is not a factor in the relationship between two 
domestic prices. Thus the “terms of trade” between China and the US will not be changed in 
this “long run” scenario.  
 Up to this point we’ve only discussed tradable goods. Anyone who has travelled abroad 
will testify to the sometimes extreme price-differences of non-branded goods and services; for 
example a haircut in one country can sometimes cost only a fraction of the price in another 
country. How are non-tradables priced then? According to the Balassa-Samuelsson hypothesis 
the prices would be determined from wages and marginal productivity of labour, henceforth 
referred to as MPL as follows: 
 
      
  
       
            Exp. 2.1.5 
 
Here we see that the prices of non-tradables are determined by wage in country i, divided by 
MPL, i.e. the marginal product of labor of non-tradables in country i. Let’s look at the 
following equations: 
 
                     
           Exp. 2.1.6 
 
                        
            Exp. 2.1.7 
 
Expression 2.1.6 and 2.1.7 assume that                   meaning that the 
productivity of non-tradable goods in both countries is equal or close to it, which is a rather 
safe assumption to make considering that non-tradable services are very similar across the 
world (Asea and Corden, 2006). But what if the productivity of tradable goods differs 
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              ? Since prices of tradable goods only show small differences corrected by 
the exchange rate, a difference in productivity of tradable goods must then result in       
      . Thus marginal productivity differences in the trade sectors explain the prices 
differences of non-tradable goods we observe when we go travelling. 
 A second implication of the Balassa-Samuelson equations is that Purchasing Power 
Parity or PPP is a function of the price of tradables and non-tradables and exchange rate is the 
ratio of domestic PPP denoted with * divided by foreign PPP: 
 
     (      )         Exp. 2.1.8 
 
And 
 
  
    
   
            Exp. 2.1.9 
 
When the marginal productivity of tradable goods in a country increases we can expect the 
prices of non-tradables to increase, so can we expect their PPP to increase (since it is in part a 
function of non-tradables). This in turn should lead to an appreciation of their exchange rate. 
During the last decades China has experienced tremendous growth, and also some exchange 
rate appreciation, many researchers some whom we mentioned in the introduction however 
argue that it is not enough and that the renminbi is still very much undervalued. 
 So far we’ve shown that the only price differences possible under fully flexible prices 
are those of non-tradables which is the result of differences in productivity in countries export 
sectors. We have thus shown that in a world where prices are fully flexible, accusations 
against China on the grounds that they are manipulating their currency to gain trade benefits 
hold no merit. Yet voices around the world have been raised with concerns regarding Chinese 
exchange rates the last decade. 
 But what if we revise our assumption that prices are flexible and move forward with 
sticky prices instead? Will exchange rates create price differences in this setting? And will 
this justify the concerns of the international community? 
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2.2 Sticky Prices 
In the last section we applied the law of one price and the Balassa-Samuelsson hypothesis to a 
world of fully flexible prices and managed to show that exchange rates could not have any 
real effects and that existing price imbalances were all due to differences in productivity 
between the labor forces operating in the export sectors. 
 In this section we will instead assume that prices are sticky, meaning that it takes some 
time for any change in productivity, foreign prices and exchange rates to affect prices, they 
will have slow-moving effects. The idea here is that if an Chinese exchange rate devaluation 
occurs it will create a temporary price imbalance, effectively creating an opportunity to trade 
from a more advantageous position, e.g. a Chinese trader exporting commodities will be able 
to sell his or hers product at the same price as before but the buyer will in a sense purchase it 
at a discount effectively letting the Chinese trader undercut an American producer without 
lowering their prices. For now we assume that this captures the “short run” rather well, we 
will however return to this question and raise a discussion as to whether we can really expect 
prices to operate in this way in the real world. 
 Let’s look at the first equations from the last section, this time with sticky prices: 
 
 ̅ 
     
              Exp. 2.2.1 
 
And 
 
 ̅ 
  
  
 
 
            Exp. 2.2.2 
 
Here we denote  ̅ 
  as the sticky Chinese prices, meaning that the right hand side of the 
expression can experience changes that have no instant effect on the left hand. The result is 
that if renminbi, devaluation should occur, i.e. the renminbi becomes cheaper, prices of 
tradable goods in the US will rise to conserve the equality. However it needs to be noted that 
the prices rise only in a relative way, meaning that it will be effectively cheaper for the US to 
import a good even though the actual renminbi price has not changed. This is the source of 
much of the criticism aimed at China; it’s perceived that any appreciation of the CNY/USD 
rate will create possibilities for Chinese manufacturers to undercut their American 
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counterparts without any real losses to profitability, a prospect that has led many nations to 
call for the WTO to take action. 
 How does this affect the equilibrium expression from the first section then? The 
expression looks very much the same, the only difference being that sticky prices have been 
added:  
 
 ̅ 
 
  
   
 ̅ 
 
 ̅ 
   
  
  
 
 ̅ 
          Exp. 2.2.3  
 
What we can observe here is that when e depreciates the CNY, price of goods in the US must 
decrease and the USD price of the same good in China increase. What effectively happens 
here is that imports become cheaper for the US and more expensive for the Chinese. The 
equality is preserved in this scenario; the terms of trade however are not unchanged as the 
denominator in the middle equation has in fact decreased, the Chinese now trade from a more 
advantageous position, i.e. the terms of trade have improved. 
 We’ve now shown that if prices are sticky then exchange rate changes can in the “short 
run” create profit opportunities which can be exploited. This leads us to the next section 
where we will reason as to whether we can expect prices to be sticky in the “short run” 
2.3 Are prices sticky? 
In this section we will make a claim as to the stickiness of money in the “short run”. In the 
previous section we’ve shown that if this is the case exchange rates can be used by countries 
to create trade benefits by devaluing their currencies, letting them export at a premium.
 Monetary neutrality is a key question in Macroeconomics and as such it’s not surprising 
that it should also be raised here, however it’s much too complex for the scope of this thesis, 
instead we show a number of viewpoints from researchers supporting the claim that money in 
non-neutral in the short run.  
 Most modern research suggests that money is neutral in the “long run” and non-neutral 
in the “short run” (Duczynsky 2005). According to the neoclassical view prices are not set 
with full information, referred to as “Indeterminacy” (Fiore 2010). The idea raised is that 
people do not have sufficient time to react on monetary changes in the “short run” causing 
monetary non-neutrality in the “short run”. This viewpoint is also supported by Lucas (1970) 
in his paper on expectations and monetary neutrality. 
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 A number of empirical studies have been performed with the aim of testing the merits of 
short-run monetary neutrality the following come to the conclusion that money is non-neutral 
in the short run: Cui, Yang, Gong, Zou (2008), Cecchetti (1986). With this much learned 
opinion on the side of short-run monetary non-neutrality (not to suggest that there are not 
conflicting views on the subject) we proceed to the next section where we will explain our 
choice of methodology. 
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3. Method 
In order to test the theoretical relationship between exchange rates and exports that we 
showed in the previous chapter we need to specify a linear empirical model. We use ordinary 
least squares on historical data, attempting to connect different market states, e.g. high/low 
exchange rate with effects on the current account, real wages and so on. We then interpret the 
signs of the coefficients and perform inference testing to control if they are in fact statistically 
significant.              
 Our empirical study examines the time period between Q1 1995 and Q4 2013, this is 
done by examining quarterly data due to unavailable monthly data on some figures. The 
starting point of 1995 of chosen due to evidence of structural breaks before that, Baak (2008) 
3.1 The Simple Model      
For the empirical hypothesis testing we will start our estimation with the following model 
(Baak, 2008). We use this model in both directions, to estimate the real exchange effect on the 
exports for both US and China. (With changed notation that is more familiar to us): 
 
                                                    Eq. 3.1.1 
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Let           denote US imports from China (or vice versa) at time zero (US import 
figures are more readily available than Chinese export figures and as such will act as a proxy 
for Chinese exports in all future calculations),       the economic activity of the importing 
country,        the real CNY/USD exchange rate,      the volatility of the exchange rate, 
       the real exchange rate between the importing country and a competing exporter, such 
as Korea or Japan. We choose Korea trading with the KRW (Korean Won) as the major 
competitor for US imports due to their similarity to China, both geographically and the in 
manner of produce they tend to export. Germany was originally intended to compete with the 
US in our model, however due to the shift from dmark to euro we instead choose Japan 
trading with the JPY (Japanese Yen). Finally we include       the error term. This regression 
aims to capture the relationship between the exchange rates and the magnitude of goods (in 
millions of US dollars/Chinese RMB) imported.       
3.2 Computing the variables 
The reader will notice that we’ve applied natural logarithms to all the following variables; this 
is to make them approximate percentages. 
3.2.1 Real Exports 
In all following equations i represent the exporting country and j the importing country. We 
define real exports as following: 
 
               (
    
      
    )      Eq. 3.2.1.1 
Where            denotes the natural logarithm of the real exports of US to China,      
denotes nominal exports from US to China,        denotes export unit value of the exporting 
country which we use as a price deflator to more accurately measure change in exports over 
time.  
 Chinese export statistics and unit value indices are in many cases not available so we 
represent Chinese exports to the US as US imports from China; these statistics are much more 
readily available.  
 
16 
 
 
 
              (
    
      
    )       Eq. 3.2.1.2 
Here we define            as the natural logarithm of US real imports from China,      
denotes US nominal imports from China,        is the import unit value index for China and 
Hong Kong. As such we define this real import function as the Chinese real export function. 
3.2.2 Real GDP 
Real GDP is often used as a proxy for economic activity (Baak, 2008), and as such we also 
use this measure. Unfortunately monthly data is unavailable for many years, forcing us to use 
quarterly data. We calculate real GDP as following: 
 
               (
        
    
    )       Eq. 3.2.2.1 
Only annual gdp deflators are available we instead use quarterly consumer price index to 
replace them. Since Baak’s paper quarterly GDP data for China has been made available 
allowing us to circumvent some of his calculations. 
3.2.3 Real bilateral exchange rates 
 
           (         
     
     
),   (             )   Eq. 3.2.3.1 
Where        is the real the natural logarithm of the real exchange rate between country i 
and j,           is the nominal exchange rate between country i and j.        is the real 
exchange rate between the importing country and the main competitor, denoted by c (we use 
Japan as the largest competitor for the US imports, and South Korea as the largest competitor 
for Chinese imports as suggested by Baak, (2008) this is computed in exactly the same way as 
the ij rate. Real exchange rate is used in our empirical model due to the staggering 
differences between the real rate and the nominal rate, as expressed in diagram 3.2.3.1 and 
3.2.3.2. 
Figure 3.2.3.1 Nominal CNY/USD exchange rate 
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Figure 3.2.3.2 Real CNY/USD exchange rate 
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    3.2.4 Real exchange rate volatility 
 
        (√
 
   
∑ (                ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅) 
  
    )    Eq. 3.2.4.1 
Where     is the natural logarithm of the standard deviation of real exchange rates between 
the importing and exporting country, e.g. CNY/USD this is the quarterly figure, denoted by t. 
This is computed by using daily figures for the nominal exchange rates. This variable is 
included due to our suspicions that exchange rate volatility has a negative effect on trade due 
to price uncertainties. 
3.3 Unit root tests 
We perform the following augmented Dickey-Fuller test to test for non-stationarity and unit 
roots, where H:0 is that   = 0 in which case the variable has a unit root (Becketti, 2013): 
 
            ∑   
 
                Eq 3.3.1 
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Let       denote the trending relationship while ∑   
 
         denotes the non-tranding 
relationship with lags. Where k is the amount of lags used in each test as determined by the 
Akaike Information Criterion. The test is performed on all the variables as can be seen in table 
5.1.1 (p.20).  
3.4 Cointegration tests 
When many variables in a model show evidence of unit roots, it’s also wise to check 
cointegrating relationships between the variables. We perform cointegration tests by creating 
new variable for each of the explanatory variables included in our model using the following 
formula, (Monogan, 2012): 
 
                           Eq. 3.4.1 
 
We then perform the Dickey-Fuller unit root tests from 3.3 on the variable. If the new variable 
is found to be stationary we conclude that the variables it’s comprised of have a cointegrating 
relationship. 
3.5 Error Correction Model 
Due to the results of the cointegration tests (table 5.1.1, 5.1.2, p 25) we adopt a two-step 
Engel-Granger Error Correction Model as specified by Best (2008) and Monogan (2012), we 
first estimate the coefficients in the error correction term using standard OLS and then 
estimate the coefficients for the whole model to grasp both the short and long term 
relationship between the variables.  
                                                              
             Eq. 3.5.1 
                                               Eq. 3.5.2 
Let EC determine the error correction term comprised of lags of the dependent and 
explanatory variables, where only GDP and real exchange rate have been added as they were 
the only processes we found to be cointegrated with the dependent variable. All the other 
variables are the same as those listed in Eq 3.1.1 (p.12).     
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 When adding lags to the model (excluding the lags of the dependent variable for 
simplicity) it will look almost like Baak’s (2008) Error Correction Model: 
               ∑            
  
    ∑            
  
    ∑          
  
    
∑            
  
                       Eq. 3.5.3 
We use sigma to denote lagged explanatory variables, where h determines the amount of lags 
included in each variable as determined by the Akaike Information criterion, Hu (2007). After 
that we remove individual lags to create a balance between overall explanatory power and 
individual variable significance. We take care to not remove individual lags if their removal 
leads to large losses of overall explanatory power. 
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4. Data 
The nominal exchange rates, Chinese export unit value index, US export unit value index, 
Chinese CPI, US urban consumer CPI,  Korean CPI and real gdp in percentages of China and 
the US have all been collected from Bloomberg. US exports and imports (used as a proxy for 
Chinese exports, due to lack of data) to/from China were taken from the US Census Bureau. 
All the figures correspond to the time period between Q1 1995 to Q4 2013. 
 All the Consumer Price indices and the export unit value indices have been converted so 
as to make 1995 the base year. 
 The Chinese imports are denoted in billions of CNY, whilst the US imports are denoted 
in millions of USD. This is not an issue due to us applying natural logarithms on all the 
variables so as to keep them in percentage form.      
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5. Results & Analysis 
Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics, real variables 
VARIABLE     Mean Standard Deviation 
China Export     10,671 0,748 
US Export     8,977 0,725 
China GDP     9,652 0,683 
US GDP     9,156 0,111 
CNY/USD     1,887 0,206 
CNY/USD Volatility   -5,901 2,083 
KRW/USD     -2,479 0,188 
JPY/CNY     -2,776 0,162 
 
*76 observations 
In this section we will present the results of our empirical study, the results of the Unit Root 
tests, Cointegration tests, the differentiated simple model, and finally the results of the error 
correction model.           
 The Error Correction Models has lags included which have been determined by using 
the Akaike information criterion and then rolling back lags to find a balance between overall 
explanatory power and statistical significance of the explanatory variables. When interpreting 
the results of the Error Correction Model we first look at the short term effects by looking at 
the individual coefficients of the lags of the explanatory variables. We then proceed to 
interpret the long term effects by adding the coefficients of the lags together as suggested by 
McKinnish (2002).            
 Inference testing for short term effects is done using t-statistics, long term effects are 
tested for joint significance using F-tests.         
 Due to the lags added the original time span of 76 observations from Q1 1995 to Q4 
2013 has been reduced to 71 observations from Q2 1996 to Q4 2013. The results are 
applicable only to that time period. 
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5.1 Unit Root Tests Results 
Table 5.1.1 Unit Root Test 
VARIABLE   Test Statistics 5 % Critical Value Reject at the 5 % level 
China Export, 4 lags   -2,464 -2,913 No 
US Export, 4 lags   -0,82 -2,91 No 
China GDP, 3 lags   -0,163 -2,912 No 
US GDP, 2 lags   -2,183 -2,912 No 
CNY/USD, 1 lag   -0,164 -2,911 No 
CNY/USD Volatility, 2 lags -1,608 -2,912 No 
USD/KRW, lag 1   -2,914 -2,911 Yes 
CNY/JPY, 4 lags   -1,533 -2,913 No 
 
* The Akaike information criterion was used to determine the lag length for the tests. 
In our own experiments regressing the variables resulted in bloated t-statistics and abnormally 
high R-squared. We thus tested all the variables during the time period of Q1 1995 to Q4 
2013 using the unit root test described in the methodology chapter. We found that all the 
variables except for the USD/KRW exchange rate are non-stationary. The test statistics are all 
higher than the 5 % critical value, suggesting the presence of unit roots. To amend this 
problem we instead use the differentials of all the variables, this is found to be successful. 
After this all the variables are found to be stationary as is shown in the below diagrams: 
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Figure 5.1.1 Real CNY/USD exchange rate 
 
 
Figure 5.1.2 Differentiated Real CNY/USD exchange rate 
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5.2 Cointegration Test Results 
Due to unit roots with one exception being present in all the variables cointegration tests are 
performed to examine whether the independent variables in each export function have long 
run trending relationships with the dependent variable. 
 
Table 5.2.1 Cointegration Test, regression, Chinese Export 
China Export   Test Statistics Critical Value Reject at the 5 % level 
US GDP   -4,807 -2,91 Yes 
CNY/USD   -3,589 -2,91 Yes 
USD/KRW   -1,283 -2,91 No 
CNY/USD Volatility, 4 lags* -2,756 -2,91 No 
 
*Using no lags the CNY/USD volatility series was found to be cointegrated with the Chinese Export series, 
however this is not particularly likely, we thus added lags to make the test more robust. 
 
The test results in table 5.1.1 indicate two cointegrating relationships; in the case of both the 
US GDP and the CNY/USD exchange we reject the null hypothesis of a joint unit root at the  
5 % level. We can conclude that the variables are cointegrated. 
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Table 5.2.2 Cointegration Test, regression, US Export 
US Export   Test Statistics Critical Value Reject at the 5 % level 
China GDP   -6,65 -2,91 Yes 
CNY/USD   -4,862 -2,91 Yes 
CNY/JPY   -2,167 -2,91 No 
CNY/USD Volatility -2,645 -2,91 No 
 
Once more two cointegrating relationships are indicated, the Chinese GDP and the CNY/USD 
exchange rate. We reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5 % level for both those 
variables. 
5.3 Differentiated Simple Model Results 
Table 5.3.1 Simple model results 
∆China Export R2=0,1166     ∆US Export R2=0,067     
                
  Coefficient t     Coefficient t   
∆US GDP 5,77 2,61 ** ∆China GDP 0,81 1,42   
∆CNY/USD -0,35 -0,32   ∆CNY/USD 1,51 1,27   
∆USD/KRW 0,16 0,84   ∆CNY/JPY 0,19 0,67   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility -0,13 -0,96   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility 0,02 1,31   
Constant 0,001 0,04   Constant 0,02 0,75   
 
*denotes 10 % significance 
**denotes 5 % significance  
***denotes 1 % significance 
 
 
Due to the results of the Unit Root Tests the simple model is regressed using the differentials 
of the variables presented in the export function presented in Eq. 3.1.1 (p. 12); this is to 
alleviate non-stationarity that was discovered in the unit root tests. We found that the results 
from the simple model are not especially telling, only one variable in the two functions is 
found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, the results, had they been significant are not 
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in line with our hypothesis, in-fact they point in the opposite direction. We find that the US 
GDP has a positive effect on the Chinese exports, a 1 % change in US GDP increases Chinese 
exports by 5,77 %. On the other hand the CNY/USD exchange rate has a negative effect on 
the Chinese exports to the US which is not in line with our hypothesis. We found that a 1 % 
appreciation of the rate leads to a 0,35 % decrease in Chinese exports, which is not 
statistically significant at the 5 % level. 
 As for the US exports function we also found results that are in opposition to our 
hypothesis. The Chinese GDP has a statistically insignificant positive effect on exports, 
however the CNY/USD exchange rate has a positive effect on the exports meaning that as the 
US dollar increases in value China would be importing more goods, and this is somewhat 
counter-intuitive.             
 All in all the results of the differentiated simple model does not seem to explain 
anything, we’ve chosen to include it to show the need for more complicated model, the results 
of which we will review in section 5.2. 
5.4 Error Correction Model Results 
Due to the results of the cointegration tests we estimate two Error Correction Models as in Eq. 
3.5.3. In this section we will review the results of the Error Correction Model. We first review 
the short run effects on the two export functions; we do this by considering individual lags of 
the explanatory variables. We then move on to the long run results where we add together the 
coefficient of the lagged variables to model long run effects as suggested by McKinnish 
(2002). Due to the lags added the Error Correction Models are estimated for the time period 
between Q2 1996 to Q4 2013.  
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Table 5.4.1 Error Correction Model results 
 
*denotes 10 % significance 
**denotes 5 % significance  
***denotes 1 % significance 
 
The short run results of the Error Correction model is presented in table 5.2.1. The differences 
between the error correction model and the simple differentiated are apparent.   
 For the Chinese export function R-squared has increased from 0,1167 to 0,5434 
implying that explanatory power has increased. However it should be noted that the 
coefficents of the variables are with the exception of the level US GDP and the second lag of 
the CNY/USD exchange rate not significant. Furthermore the lagged coefficents often change 
in magnitude and sometimes even change sign completely.     
∆China Export R2=0,5434     ∆US Export R2=0,540     
                
  Coefficient  t     Coefficient t    
∆US GDP 5,35 2,66 *** ∆China GDP 0,65 1,84 * 
Lag 1 -2,73 1,36           
∆CNY/USD 0,27 0,24   ∆CNY/USD -0,93 -0,78   
Lag 1 -0,32 -0,31   Lag 1 1,07 1,14   
Lag 2 -2,52 -2,72 *** Lag 2 -1,77 -1,79 * 
Lag 3 1,29 1,31   Lag 3 -1,71 -1,75 * 
Lag 4 1,56 1,47   Lag 4 2,72 2,61 ** 
∆USD/KRW -0,07 -0,47   ∆CNY/JPY, 0,1 0,41   
        Lag 1 -0,18 -0,77   
        Lag 2 -0,02 -0,08   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility -0,002 -0,47   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility 0,01 1,14   
Lag 1 0,01 0,86   Lag 1 0,002 1,15   
Lag 2 0,02 1,56   Lag 2 0,02 1,23   
Lag 3 -0,01 -0,67   Lag 3 0 0,47   
Lag 4 -0,001 -0,09           
Error Correction -0,63 -0,49 *** Error Correction -0,72 -5,82 *** 
Constant 0,47 5 *** Constant 0,02 0,88   
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 The US export function suffers from much the same problems as the Chinese one, 
however more statistical significance is found in this function. Both the Chinese GDP and 3 
of the CNY/USD exchange rate lags are found to be statistically significant.   
 Baak (2008) runs into the same kind of issues in his paper, he concludes that the short 
run effects are hard to pinpoint and instead points to the long term effects; just as we will do 
in the next section. However McKinnish (2002) suggests that unruly coefficients that don’t 
make any economic sense might be due to problems with multicolinearity. McKinnish 
suggests that weighted restrictions should be imposed on the coefficents to battle this 
problem. This kind of solution is however not included in this thesis.  
 
Table 5.4.2 Error Correction Model results, joint effects 
∆China Export R2=0,5434     ∆US Export R2=0,540     
                
  Coefficient F     Coefficient F   
∆US GDP, 1 lag 2,62 3,73 ** 
∆China GDP, 0 
lags 0,65 3,39 * 
∆CNY/USD, 4 
lags 0,28 2,32 * 
∆CNY/USD, 4 
lags -0,62 2,97 ** 
∆USD/KRW, 0 
lags -0,07 0,22   
∆CNY/JPY, 2 
lags -0,1 0,27   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility, 4 lags 0,02 0,85   
∆CNY/USD 
Volatility, 4 lags 0,04 0,78   
Error Correction -0,63 -0,49 *** Error Correction -0,72 -5,82 *** 
Constant 0,47 5 *** Constant 0,02 0,88   
 
*denotes 10 % significance 
**denotes 5 % significance  
***denotes 1 % significance 
 
 
The long run effects are presented in table 5.2.2. The results are computed by adding up the 
lagged coefficients from the short run results presented in table 5.2.3 as suggested by 
McKinnish (2002).             
 US GDP is found to have a significant and positive effect on Chinese exports, a 1 % 
increase in US GDP leads to a 2,62 % increase in Chinese exports to the US. The CNY/USD 
exchange rate now instead has a positive and significant coefficient, when the RMB 
depreciates by 1 % Chinese exports to the US increase by 0,28 %.  
 Chinese GDP is also found to have a positive and significant (10 % level) effect on US 
exports, a 1 % increase in Chinese GDP leads to a 0,65 % increase in US exports to China. 
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The CNY/USD exchange rate has a negative effect on US exports; meaning that as the 
Chinese RMB depreciates the US exports to China decrease which seems to make more sense 
than the results we saw in the differentiated simple model from 5.2.  
 It’s worth noting here that the most significant variable in all the regressions is always 
the GDP of respective countries, it has much larger effect on the exports than the exchange 
rate, particularly in the case of the Chinese exports to the US. 
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6. Conclusions 
Our thesis has analyzed the real effects of exchange rate on the US-Chinese bilateral trade 
using a “law of one price” theoretical framework and ordinary least squares regression using 
both a differentiated simple model and an Error Correction Model. We also estimated the 
effect of other relevant variables such as GDP, exchange rate volatility and a competing 
country’s exchange rate using the OLS. Theoretical evidence suggests that if prices are sticky 
exchange rate devaluation can be used to claim trade benefits which empirical evidence also 
supports in a long run (4 quarters) framework.  
 Our empirical study found that 1 % depreciation of the Chinese RMB would increase 
Chinese exports to the US by 0,271 % and decrease US exports to China by 0,621 %, which is 
very much in line with our hypothesis. 
 Our findings show that historically China has received benefits from their exchange rate 
depreciating. We have presented no evidence that China have in-fact manipulated their 
exchange rate, but it is clear that some benefits could possibly be had from doing so.  
 Even though we have found the real exchange rate to have significant effect on the trade 
relationship between the US and China one must remember that this is very much 
overshadowed by the effect of increasing economic activity. When analyzing the trade 
relationship between two countries we strongly recommend not staring one-self blind on 
various financial variables and noting that real variable such as GDP have the largest effect. 
 Further research on the topic is needed. A study that takes into account the possibility of 
multicolinearity in the variables and take steps to amend the problem of unruly lagged 
coefficients by imposing restrictions on them, might well be able to more accurately pinpoint 
the short term effects.            
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